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Prospective Guidelines for Navigation and
Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone
Sam Bateman*
the Exclusive Economic Zone’. The proposed
Guidelines are non-binding in nature. They set
out broad principles of common understanding
regarding certain aspects of navigation and
overflight in the EEZ, including military and
intelligence gathering activities, but do not create
legally binding obligations between states. In
keeping with their non-binding nature, the
Guidelines are framed in exhortatory rather than
obligatory language. They may be generally
regarded as reflecting the need for better
understanding of the rights and obligations of
states conducting activities in the EEZ of another
country. They represent a consensus among the
Group 21 members on issues that are at present
contentious and a potential source of tension and
dispute in the region. The introduction to the
Guidelines, the Guidelines themselves, and a list
of members of EEZ Group 21 are attached as
Annexes A, B and C respectively to this paper.

Introduction
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime was
a major development in the international law of
the sea, emerging from the Third UN Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that
culminated in the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1 Military activities in
the EEZ were a controversial issue at UNCLOS
III and continue to be so in state practice. Some
coastal states claim that other states cannot carry
out military activities in or over their EEZs
without their consent, and have sought to apply
restrictions on navigation and overflight in their
EEZs that are not accepted by other states.
The issues involved have become particularly
contentious in the Asia-Pacific region where
there has been a series of incidents and disputes
that might have spiralled out of control into open
conflict. With the aims of clarifying the rights
and duties of both coastal states and user states in
an EEZ, and of providing an important regional
maritime confidence and security building
measure (MCSBM), a group of senior officials,
legal experts and maritime specialists (now
known as the EEZ Group 21) has been meeting
in the region to address relevant issues.2 The
meetings were sponsored primarily by the Ship
and Ocean Foundation of Japan (now the Ocean
Policy Research Foundation)3 with the objective
of producing a set of non-binding, voluntary
principles (‘Guidelines’), which would provide
the basis for a common understanding and
approach to issues arising from the
implementation of the EEZ regime.

Background
Negotiation of the EEZ regime at UNCLOS III
was difficult and complex with widely divergent
points of view about the status of the new zone.
One major group, the ‘territorialists’, mainly
comprising developing countries, saw the EEZ
as an extension of national jurisdiction in which
the coastal states would enjoy sovereignty
subject to certain limitations. However, this
position was sharply disputed by the maritime
powers, led by the United States and the then
Soviet Union, who saw the zone as a part of the
high seas where coastal states had some rights
over offshore resources. The compromise
reached was that the EEZ should be regarded as
a separate zone in its own right (‘sui generis’),
which was neither high seas nor territorial sea.4

The last meeting of the EEZ Group 21 held in
Tokyo 15-16 September 2005 reached agreement
on ‘Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in
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2522, Australia (email address: sbateman@uow.edu.au), and currently also a Senior Fellow and Adviser to the Maritime
Security Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) in Singapore (email address:
issambateman@ntu.edu.sg). He was a member of the EEZ Group 21.
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survey activity will be subject to fines and
confiscation of equipment and data.12

Now some twenty-five years later, this political
‘tug of war’ has not gone away. The United
States has steadfastly maintained a liberal
interpretation of the rights and freedoms other
states enjoy in the EEZ of a coastal state, and has
coined the expression ‘international waters’ to
describe collectively the high seas, the EEZ and
the contiguous zone.5 On the other hand, some
coastal states have sought to strengthen the
extent of their jurisdiction over their EEZ by for
example, claiming that other states should only
conduct military activities in that zone with their
consent.

These issues are proving particularly problematic
in the Asia-Pacific region. Large areas of this
region are enclosed as EEZs by one country or
another and many regional countries have large
EEZs in which they tend to jealously protect
their rights, particularly at a time when countries
are paying much greater attention to the resource
potential of their offshore areas. Furthermore,
there are many conflicting and overlapping
claims to maritime jurisdiction in the region and
relatively few maritime boundaries have been
agreed. Meanwhile, naval capabilities in the
region are improving rapidly and increased
attention is being given to intelligence collection
and marine environmental research to support
naval operations. To some extent, the EEZ
regime has been a cause of maritime
militarisation in the region with the protection of
large maritime zones and marine resources,
along with the existence of conflicting claims to
offshore areas, often being used as justification
for acquiring new maritime capabilities,
including missile-armed patrol vessels and
maritime strike aircraft.

In particular, different opinions exist as to
whether coastal state jurisdiction extends to
hydrographic surveying and the collection of
other marine environmental data that is not
resource-related or is not done for scientific
purposes.6 While the UNCLOS has established a
clear regime for marine scientific research, there
is no specific provision in the Convention for
hydrographic surveying. Some coastal states
require consent with respect to hydrographic
surveys conducted in their EEZ by other states
while it is the opinion of other states that
hydrographic surveys can be conducted freely in
the EEZ.7

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that
incidents have already occurred involving
disputes between coastal states and other states
over their respective rights and duties in the
EEZ. Research vessels claiming to be conducting
military surveys have been warned out of the
EEZs of some coastal states, a Chinese fighter
aircraft crashed after colliding with a US
intelligence collection aircraft in China’s EEZ
off Hainan in April 2001, and alleged ‘spy ships’
have been pursued out of Japan’s EEZ with one
vessel even being sunk after hot pursuit into
China’s EEZ. Coastal state legislation and
offshore activities are beginning to conflict with
increasing naval activities of non-coastal states in
the region, including exercises, intelligence
gathering and research, and their accompanying
technological developments.

The United States regards military surveying as
similar to hydrographic surveying and thus part
of the high seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight and other international lawful uses of
the sea related to those freedoms, and conducted
with due regard to the rights and duties of the
coastal state.8 The position of the United States is
that while coastal state consent must be obtained
in order to conduct marine scientific research in
its EEZ, the coastal state cannot regulate
hydrographic surveys or military surveys
conducted beyond its territorial sea, nor can it
require notification of such activities.9 Similarly,
the United Kingdom regards Military Data
Gathering (MDG) as a fundamental high seas
freedom available in the EEZ.10 However, other
states, including China, have specifically claimed
that hydrographic surveys might only be
conducted in their EEZs with their consent.11 In
December 2002, China announced that it had
enacted a new law explicitly requiring Chinese
approval of all survey and mapping activities in
China’s EEZ and stating that unapproved ocean-

The explanation of these disputes can be traced
back to ambiguity in the EEZ regime, as
established by UNCLOS, and a range of
perspectives in Asia with regard to interpreting
and implementing the regime. Agreement on the
EEZ concept at UNCLOS III included many
18
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exercises, telecommunications and space
activities, intelligence and surveillance
activities, marine data collection, and weapons’
testing and firing.19

compromises between coastal states and
maritime powers resulting in intentional
ambiguity in some of its provisions. It was
formulated more than 25 years ago in very
different political and technological circumstances than those that exist at present. Tensions
and misunderstandings may increase unless
some greater clarity and awareness of the EEZ
regime is provided and agreed.

Those words were written about ten years ago
and would most likely now be qualified at least
by recognition of the need for such activities to
be conducted with due regard to the rights and
duties of the coastal state. For example,
scheduling an exercise in an area of intensive
fishing activity declared by the coastal state, or
in a marine park or marine protected area
declared by the coastal state as required by
Article 194(5) of UNCLOS,20 could be
considered not to have due regard to the rights
and duties of the coastal state.

Balance of Rights and Duties
The basic problem with the EEZ regime lies in
the need to find an appropriate balance between
the rights and duties of the coastal state and those
of other states.13 In the EEZ, coastal states have
sovereign rights over natural resources, both
living and non-living, and other economic
activities, such as the production of energy from
water currents and winds.14 They also have
jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and
use of artificial islands, installations and
structures; marine scientific research; and the
protection and preservation of the marine
environment (including the conservation of
species), as well as other rights and duties, as
provided for in relevant provisions of
UNCLOS.15 However, the sovereign rights to
marine resources gained under the EEZ regime
are not without their costs in terms of obligations
of the coastal state for preserving and protecting
the marine environment and conserving species
in the EEZ, and for having due regard to the
rights and duties of other states in its EEZ.16

Military Activities
The basic problem with military activities in the
EEZ is that it is not unambiguously clear from
UNCLOS whether military activities are
included in the freedoms of navigation and
overflight and other internationally lawful uses
of the sea available under UNCLOS Articles 58
and 87.21 The United States insists on the
freedom of military activities in the EEZ out of
concern that its naval and air access and mobility
could be severely restricted by any global trend
towards ‘thickening jurisdiction’ over the EEZ.
The ability to conduct military activities in the
EEZ, including military surveying and
intelligence collection, is justified on the basis
that they are part of the normal high seas
freedoms of navigation and overflight that are
available in an EEZ under UNCLOS. However,
some coastal states, including Bangladesh,
Malaysia, India and Pakistan, contend that other
states cannot carry out military exercises or
manoeuvres in or over their EEZ without their
consent. The concern of these states is that
uninvited military activities could threaten their
national security or undermine their resource
sovereignty.

All other states have freedom of navigation and
overflight in the EEZ, as well as the freedom to
lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
those freedoms.17 However, in exercising these
freedoms, other states are required to have due
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal
state.18 It has proven very difficult to define an
operational test to distinguish between an action
that has due regard to the rights and duties of the
other party, and one that does not.

Military Surveys

A view from the United States is that the EEZ
regime

Military surveys are activities undertaken in the
ocean and coastal waters involving marine data
collection (whether or not classified) for military
purposes.22 Such data is important, even
essential, for effective submarine operations,

does not permit the coastal state to limit
traditional non-resources related high seas
activities in this EEZ, such as task force
manoeuvring, flight operations, military
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collection data is only used for military purposes
and is not released for public purposes. Again the
boundaries between ‘military surveys’ and
‘intelligence collection’ may be difficult to
determine, and one vessel may concurrently
undertake both activities although the external
appearance of the vessel (e.g. the aerials on a
signals or electronic intelligence vessel), the
equipment it is operating (e.g. the type of sonar),
and its movements (e.g. whether it is
manoeuvring, stopping or continually underway)
should give a good lead on the nature of its data
collection.

anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare
and mine countermeasures (MCM), particularly
in waters such as the South and East China Seas
where oceanographic and underwater acoustic
conditions vary widely with uneven bottom
topography, fast tidal streams and a relatively
high level of marine life. Roach and Smith have
observed that:
Military surveys can include oceanographic,
marine geological, geophysical, chemical,
biological and acoustic data. Equipment used
can include fathometers, swath bottom
mappers, side scan sonars, bottom grab and
coring systems, current meters and profilers.
While the means of data collection used in
military surveys may sometimes be the same as
that used in marine scientific research,
information from such activities, regardless of
security classification, is intended not for use
by the general scientific community, but by the
military.23

Based on current and planned asset acquisitions
in the Asia-Pacific region, military surveying and
intelligence gathering activities in EEZs are
going to become more controversial and more
dangerous. In Asia, the disturbing prospects
reflect the increasing (and changing) demands
for technical intelligence; the robust weapons
acquisition programs, and especially the
increasing electronic warfare (EW) capabilities;
and the widespread moves to develop
Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. Regional
countries are expanding or developing submarine
forces and face a need to expand their
oceanographic knowledge. The scale and scope
of intelligence collection activities are likely to
expand rapidly over the next decade, involving
levels and sorts of activities quite unprecedented
in the past. They will not only become more
intensive; they will generally be more intrusive.
These factors all point to the importance of
confidence-building measures such as the
proposed Guidelines.

Military surveying is an expression largely
coined by the United States, but the United
Kingdom talks about MDG in similar vein.24
These terms are not specifically addressed by
UNCLOS and there is no language stating or
implying that coastal states may regulate their
conduct in any manner outside their territorial
sea or archipelagic waters.25 Thus the United
States ‘reserves the right to engage in military
surveys outside foreign territorial seas and
archipelagic waters’, and that to ‘provide prior
notice or request permission would create an
adverse precedent for restrictions on mobility
and flexibility of military survey operation’.26
Similarly the United Kingdom believes that
states have a right to engage in MDG anywhere
outside foreign territorial seas and archipelagic
waters without prior notice to, or permission
from the coastal state.

Development of the Guidelines
Process
The EEZ Group 21 meetings were designed to
delineate the issues and the areas of agreement
and disagreement, and to identify and discuss
possible voluntary guidelines for such activities
which could reduce conflict potential. Topics
covered included recent incidents, operational
modalities of various navies and their rules of
engagement, the meaning of key terms,
initiatives to enhance maritime security,
intelligence collection operations and EEZs,
means and manner of implementation and

Some military intelligence collection activities
conducted in the EEZ might also be considered
as coming within the scope of ‘scientific
research’, and thus within the scope of the
marine scientific research regime in UNCLOS.27
However, the United States and other maritime
powers are strongly of the view that while these
activities are within the scope of research, they
are associated with the freedoms of navigation
and overflight in the EEZ and not under the
jurisdiction of the coastal State. Intelligence
20
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undermine the rights or ability of coastal states to
protect and manage their own resources and
environment. For example, Guideline IId
recognises that the coastal state may, on a
temporary basis, place qualifications on the
freedom of navigation in areas where special
circumstances exist in its EEZ, such as major
fishing grounds and marine protected areas, and
that these arrangements may be made permanent
by reference to the competent international
organization. Similarly, Guideline Vg lists areas
in the EEZ where military activities should not
be conducted by another state.

enforcement of any agreed rules, options for
resolving disagreements, and the way forward.
The title of the meetings ‘The Regime of the
Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and
Responses’ implies that they looked at the EEZ
regime in an all-embracing fashion but this was
not the case. The meetings focused mainly on the
rights and duties of states with regard to the
conduct of military activities, surveys and
intelligence collection in the EEZs. They paid
little attention to the host of other issues
associated with implementing the regime, such
as the conservation and utilisation of living
resources and the rights of land-locked and
geographically disadvantaged states. The main
articles of UNCLOS addressed at the meetings
were Articles 56, 58 and to a somewhat lesser
extent, 59. However, they did not consider the
full extent of the rights, jurisdiction and duties of
the coastal state in its EEZ (Article 56) or indeed,
all the rights and duties of other States in the
EEZ of a foreign state (Article 58). Most
attention with the latter was on activities related
to the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and
operations by foreign ships and aircraft in an
EEZ.

Guideline IVb recognises that maritime
surveillance may be conducted by states for
peaceful purposes in areas claimed by other
states as EEZ. On military activities generally,
Guideline Vb recognises the principle that ships
and aircraft of a state undertaking military
activities in the EEZ of another state have the
obligations to use the ocean for peaceful
purposes only, and to refrain from the threat or
use of force, or provocative acts, such as
stimulating or exciting the defensive systems of
the coastal state; collecting information to
support the use of force against the coastal state;
or establishing a ‘sea base’ within another state’s
EEZ without its consent. The avoidance of
interference between the electronic systems of
the coastal state and ships and aircraft exercising
their freedoms of navigation and overflight is
covered by Guideline VI.

Areas of Agreement
There was agreement that the EEZ is a zone sui
generis, and in this regard, the term
‘international waters’ used by the United States
was thought to be misleading. The EEZ Group
21 agreed on the fundamental principle that
subject to certain qualifications noted in the
Guidelines, military vessels and aircraft have the
right to navigate in, or fly over the EEZs of other
states, and to engage in other internationally
lawful uses of the sea associated with the
operations of ships and aircraft (Guideline Va).
However, in interpreting this and other
principles, participants agreed on the importance
of ‘due regard’, and that this consideration
applies to both the coastal state and to a user
state. There was recognition that the
interpretation of international law is not static,
and that the understanding of the rights and
duties of states in the EEZ continues to evolve.

In reaching consensus that hydrographic
surveying in an EEZ should not be conducted
without the consent of the coastal state
(Guideline IXa), the EEZ Group 21 appreciated
the many changes since UNCLOS III with the
practice and technology of hydrographic
surveying and the utility of hydrographic data.28
Apart from navigational safety, important
applications of hydrographic knowledge include
planning the exploration and exploitation of
marine resources, the determination of seaward
limits of national jurisdiction, coastal zone
management, national development (including
building new ports and harbours), and the
delimitation of maritime boundaries.29 Coastal
state consent for hydrographic surveying should
normally be granted unless the surveys fall

The EEZ Group 21 agreed that the exercise of
the freedom of navigation and overflight in and
above EEZs should not interfere with, or
21
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interest of the coastal state. An interpretation
applicable to many cases would be whether the
activity interferes with the rights and interests of
the other state. But there is no agreement as to
what constitutes such rights and interests,
whether the interference must be unreasonable,
and whether it must be actual or potential.

within one of the consent categories in
UNCLOS Article 246(5) (Guideline IXb).
There was agreement that the exercise of the
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ
should not be for the purpose of marine scientific
research without coastal state consent, subject
only to the principle of ‘implied consent’ set out
in UNCLOS Article 252. However, coastal state
consent for hydrographic surveying should
normally be granted unless the surveys fall
within one of the consent categories in UNCLOS
Article 246(5) (Guideline IXb).

There is also disagreement on how to deal with
these uncertainties. But leaving the problem
unresolved could be dangerous. Incidents are
occurring more frequently and even if bilateral
arrangements are agreed, their rules may differ
depending on the countries and circumstances.
The majority of EEZ Group 21 participants
shared the concern that national governments
may deal with these matters unilaterally in order
to protect their security and other interests. If
numerous coastal states were to enact unilateral
national legislation prohibiting the exercise of
military and intelligence gathering activities in
and above their EEZ, then the prohibition against
conducting such exercises could become part of
customary international law through state
practice, despite the opposition of some
countries, particularly if those countries are not
parties to UNCLOS.

Areas of Disagreement
Areas of disagreement during the meetings
generally related to the meaning of terms in the
Convention as well as to the meaning of specific
articles. For example, there are specific
differences with regard to the meaning of
‘freedom’ of navigation and overflight in and
above the EEZ, i.e. whether this freedom can be
limited by certain regulations by the coastal state,
or whether such freedoms are absolute.
There are different interpretations regarding the
precise meaning of the Convention’s phrase
allowing ‘other internationally lawful uses’ of
the sea in the EEZ,30 and the nature of the
military activities that this phrase might include.
The interpretation of this phrase can in turn be
affected by the interpretation of such terms as
‘due regard’, ‘abuse of rights’, ‘peaceful
purposes’,31 and the obligation not to threaten or
use force against other states. In this context,
questions arise as to whether some military and
intelligence gathering activities are a lawful
exercise of the freedom of navigation and
overflight, whether they are an abuse of rights,
whether they pay ‘due regard’ to the interests of
the coastal state, and whether they are a threat to
the peace and security of the coastal state.

Failing the unlikely resolution of these issues by
the International Court of Justice or the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea,
these disputes will be addressed through a
chaotic and disorderly process whereby countries
assert and defend their positions through state
practice, followed by protests by countries that
disagree, and eventually by the give and take of
diplomatic negotiations. It is in this context of
avoiding unilateralism that may lead to conflict
and of providing a common basis for bilateral
and multilateral agreements that this dialogue
and the Guidelines were developed.
Conclusion

There is a considerable range of opinion
regarding the meaning of ‘due regard’. Some
countries, e.g. the United States, interpret ‘due
regard’ as requiring any user state to refrain from
activities that unreasonably interfere with the
exercise of the rights of the coastal state.
However, others like China, for example, appear
to interpret ‘due regard’ as requiring foreign
users of the EEZ to refrain from activities which
endanger the sovereignty, security and national

Much has changed over the last 25 years and
international law is still evolving with regard to
the implementation of the EEZ regime. The
Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the
EEZ produced by the EEZ Group 21 are
intended to contribute to more effective
implementation of the regime and improved
oceans management generally. They recognise
the general principle that military activities in the
22
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Copies of the EEZ Group 21 Guidelines are now
to be distributed at a regional and international
level. At the regional level, distribution will
include APEC, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), the
Council for Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacific (CSCAP), and the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS).32 At the international level,
they will be sent to the UN Division for Ocean
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, the International
Maritime Organization, and the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. Individual
members of the EEZ Group 21 have been asked
to promote the Guidelines to their own national
authorities.

EEZ, including military surveying and
intelligence collection, are part of the freedoms
of navigation, overflight, and engagement in
other internationally lawful uses of the sea
associated with the operations of ships and
aircraft. However, the Guidelines also recognise
that these freedoms are not absolute and must be
conducted with ‘due regard’ to the rights and
obligations of the coastal state in its EEZ. The
Guidelines are intended to assist in clarifying
what might be considered as not having ‘due
regard’ to the rights and duties of the various
parties.

ANNEX A
Introduction to the Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone
generate tension and produce defensive reactions and
escalatory dynamics. And new threats like trade in
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, piracy, and
smuggling of arms, drugs and humans encourage both
coastal and maritime states to extend their control or
surveillance beyond their territorial seas, in some cases to
others’ EEZs. Further, given the myriad boundary disputes
and overlapping claims in the region, it is not always clear
where one nation’s jurisdiction ends and another’s begins.
Confusion and differences of opinion regarding the regime
governing military activities in the EEZ further
complicates the issue.

Introduction
This document puts forward proposed ‘Guidelines for
Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ)’ developed by a group of senior officials and
analysts primarily from countries of the Asia-Pacific region
participating in their personal capacities in a series of
meetings held from 2002-2005.* The Guidelines are a set
of non-binding, voluntary principles which provide the
basis for a common understanding and approach to issues
arising from the implementation of the EEZ regime,
particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. The principles are
based on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(the 1982 UNCLOS), state practice, and emerging ‘soft’
law.

Agreement on the EEZ concept included many
compromises between coastal states and maritime powers
resulting in intentional ambiguity in some of its provisions.
It was formulated more than 25 years ago in very different
political and technological circumstances than those that
exist at present. The ambiguities and lack of clarity should
be examined in the light of these changed circumstances
and evolving state practice with a view to reaching agreed
interpretation.

Misunderstandings regarding military activities in foreign
EEZs have become all too common. Major incidents
include the March 2001 confrontation between the US
Navy survey vessel Bowditch and a Chinese frigate in
China’s EEZ; the April 2001 collision between a US EP3
surveillance plane and a Chinese jet fighter over China’s
EEZ; the December 2001 Japanese Coast Guard pursuit of
and firing at a North Korean spy vessel in its and China’s
EEZ; and Vietnam’s protest against Chinese live fire
exercises in Vietnam’s claimed EEZ. Navies are expanding
and technology is advancing while coastal states are
placing increasing importance on control over their EEZs.
These opposing trends will result in a higher frequency and
intensity of such incidents.

Importance of These Guidelines
These Guidelines are important for three main reasons. The
first is the complexity of the Asian maritime environment
with its unique combination of maritime geography, large
areas of claimed EEZ, and many conflicting and
overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. Second, recent
incidents indicate that there is considerable ambiguity and
range of perspective in Asia with regard to the EEZ
regime, particularly the rights and duties of the coastal state
vis-à-vis those of user states. Third, coastal state legislation
and offshore activities are beginning to conflict with
increasing naval activities of non-coastal states in the
region, including exercises, intelligence gathering and
research, and their accompanying technological
developments. Tensions and misunderstandings may

Other factors contribute to the problem. The scale and
scope of maritime and airborne intelligence collection
activities is becoming more intensive and intrusive. They

* Bali (June 2002), Tokyo (February 2003), Honolulu
(December 2003), Shanghai (October 2004), and
Tokyo (September 2005).
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increase unless greater clarity and awareness of the EEZ
regime are provided and agreed.

understanding and more effective implementation of
the EEZ regime.

Purpose of the Guidelines

Legal Status

The Guidelines serve three main purposes:

The proposed Guidelines are non-binding in nature. They
set out broad principles of common understanding
regarding military and intelligence gathering activities in
the EEZ but do not create legally binding obligations
between states. In keeping with their non-binding nature,
the Guidelines are framed in exhortatory rather than
obligatory language.

•

First, they assist in clarifying the rights and duties of
both coastal states and user states and certain
terminology with regard to the activities that might be
undertaken in an EEZ by foreign ships and aircraft.

•

Second, the Guidelines constitute an important
regional confidence-building measure providing
general principles for activities that some states
currently regard as contentious.

•

The Guidelines may be generally regarded as reflecting the
need for better understanding of the rights and obligations
of states conducting activities in the EEZ of another
country. They represent a consensus among the
participants on issues that are at present contentious and a
potential source of tension and dispute in the region.

Third, they will contribute to more effective oceans
management in the region through improved

ANNEX B
Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
exercises in its internal waters, archipelagic waters (if any),
and territorial sea;

PREAMBLE
Participants in the Dialogue on ‘The Regime of the
EEZ: Issues and Responses’:

Recognizing that Article 300 of the 1982 UNCLOS
prohibits the abuse of rights, jurisdiction and freedoms
recognized under the Convention;

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the United
Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace
and security and the promotion of friendly relations
between States;

Acknowledging the importance of resolving disputes by
peaceful means; and

Recognizing that the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (the 1982 UNCLOS) establishes a new
regime for the seas and oceans which balances fairly the
interests of all States;

Convinced that these Guidelines will promote
understanding of the rights and duties of States conducting
military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of
another State, and thus contribute to peace, good order, and
security at sea, particularly in the Asia Pacific region;

Affirming the duty of all States to utilize the oceans for
peaceful purposes as stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS
Article 301;

Hereby recommend the following non-binding Guidelines
for Navigation and Overflight in the EEZ.
I. DEFINITIONS

Acknowledging the obligation of all States to preserve and
protect the marine environment;

a. For the purposes of these Guidelines:
1. ‘abuse of rights’ means the unnecessary or
arbitrary exercise of rights, jurisdiction and
freedoms, or interference with the exercise of
rights by another State, or the abuse or misuse
of powers by a State causing injury to another
State;
2. ‘exclusive economic zone’ means an area
referred to as such in relevant Articles of the
1982 UNCLOS;
3. ‘hydrographic survey’ means a survey having
for its principal purpose the determination of
data relating to bodies of water. A hydrographic
survey may consist of the determination of one
or several of the following classes of data:
depth of water, configuration and nature of the
seabed; directions and force of currents; heights
and times of tides and water stages; and
location of topographic features and fixed
objects for survey and navigation purposes;

Considering that the EEZ is neither high seas nor territorial
sea and is subject to a specific legal regime under the 1982
UNCLOS;
Desiring to ensure the safety and security of navigation in
the EEZ;
Recognizing the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the
coastal State in the EEZ as provided in Article 56 of the
1982 UNCLOS;
Recognizing the rights and duties of other States in the EEZ
as provided in Article 58 of the 1982 UNCLOS;
Recognizing a need for balance between the rights and
duties of a coastal State in its EEZ and the rights and duties
of other States;
Mindful that the sovereign rights and jurisdiction exercised
by a coastal State in its EEZ differ from the sovereignty it
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permanent by reference to the competent
international organization.
e. Any restriction on navigation and overflight
imposed by a coastal State in its EEZ due to its
weapons tests and exercises, or any other
operational activity, should be temporary, in
specified areas only, and only if such suspension is
essential for the carrying out of such tests and
exercises.

4.

‘marine environment’ is the physical ,
chemical,
geological
and
biological
components, conditions and factors which
interact and determine the productivity, state,
condition and quality of the marine ecosystem,
the waters of the seas and the oceans and the
airspace above those waters, as well as the
seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof;
5. ‘marine scientific research’ means activities
undertaken in the marine environment to
enhance scientific knowledge regarding the
nature and natural processes of the seas and
oceans, the seabed and subsoil;
6. ‘military activities’ means the operations of
military vessels, aircraft and devices, including
intelligence gathering, exercises, trials, training,
and weapons practices;
7. ‘military surveys’ refers to activities undertaken
in the marine environment involving data
collection for military purposes;
8. ‘peaceful uses/purposes’ in the context of the
EEZ means that uses of that zone, or the
purposes of activities conducted therein or
thereabove, must not threaten or use force;
9. ‘surveillance’ means the observation by visual
or any technical means of activities on, over or
under the seas and oceans; and
10. ‘threat of force’ means a coercive attempt to
compel another State to take or not to take
certain specific action, or an action that is
directed against the territorial integrity or
political independence of that State, or against
any of its assets or people, or taken in any other
manner inconsistent with the UN Charter.

III. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF OTHER STATES
a. While exercising the freedoms of navigation and
overflight in an EEZ, States should avoid activities
that unreasonably prejudice the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State.
b. States’ exercise of the freedoms of navigation and
overflight should not interfere with or endanger the
rights of the coastal State to protect and manage its
own resources and their environment.
c. The exercise by other States of the freedoms of
navigation and overflight should not interfere with
the rights of the coastal State with regard to its
establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures in its EEZ.
IV. MARITIME SURVEILLANCE
a. The right of a coastal State to conduct maritime
surveillance in its EEZ should not be impeded by
other States exercising their rights in that zone. In
this context, the foreign State must have due regard
to the rights and duties of the coastal State.
b. Maritime surveillance may be conducted by States
for peaceful purposes in areas claimed by other
States as EEZ. This surveillance should not
prejudice
the
jurisdictional
rights
and
responsibilities of the coastal State within its EEZ.
c. States should develop arrangements for the sharing
of surveillance information with coastal States.

II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COASTAL
STATE
a. A coastal State may, in accordance with international law, regulate navigation in its EEZ by ships
carrying inherently dangerous or noxious
substances in their cargo.
b. The coastal State should have due regard for other
States’ freedoms of navigation and overflight and of
the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
these freedoms, such as those associated with the
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables
and pipelines.
c. Each State using another State’s EEZ should ensure
that its vessels and aircraft with sovereign
immunity, act, as far as is reasonable and
practicable, in a manner consistent with the 1982
UNCLOS.
d. In recognition of its rights and obligations with
regard to the management of the marine
environment and marine living and non-living
resources, the coastal State may, on a temporary
basis, place qualifications on the freedom of
navigation in areas with special circumstances in its
EEZ, such as major fishing grounds and marine
protected areas. These arrangements may be made

V. MILITARY ACTIVITIES
a. With the exception of the qualifications noted
elsewhere in these guidelines, military vessels and
aircraft have the right to navigate in, or fly over the
EEZs of other States, and to engage in other
internationally lawful uses of the sea associated
with the operations of ships and aircraft.
b. Ships and aircraft of a State undertaking military
activities in the EEZ of another State have the
obligation to use the ocean for peaceful purposes
only, and to refrain from the threat or use of force,
or provocative acts, such as stimulating or exciting
the defensive systems of the coastal State; collecting
information to support the use of force against the
coastal State; or establishing a ‘sea base’ within
another State’s EEZ without its consent. The user
State should have due regard for the rights of others
to use the sea including the coastal State and
comply with its obligations under international law.
c. Warships or aircraft of a State intending to carry out
a major military exercise in the EEZ of another
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freedoms of navigation or overflight in or over the
coastal State’s EEZ.
c. In order to make subparagraphs a and b effective,
States should conclude agreements regarding
mutual non-interference with communications,
computer and electronic systems.

State should inform the coastal State and others
through a timely navigational warning of the time,
date and areas involved in the exercise, and if
possible, invite observers from the coastal State to
witness the exercise.
Military activities in the EEZ of other States should
not hamper the search and rescue operations of the
coastal State in its EEZ. States should co-operate in
any such search and rescue operations.
Military activities by a State in the EEZ of another
State should not involve the deployment of systems
that prejudice the defense or security of the coastal
State, or interfere with or endanger the right of the
coastal State to protect and manage its resources
and environment.
Military activities of a State in the EEZs of other
States should not cause pollution or negatively
affect the marine environment or marine living
resources, including mammals. In particular, if
prohibited by the laws of the coastal State, such
activities in a coastal State’s EEZ should not
involve live weapons fire, underwater explosions or
creation of sound waves and dangerous or
radioactive materials that may directly or indirectly
harm marine life or cause marine pollution.
Military activities by another State should not be
conducted:
1) in areas which have been announced by the
coastal State as temporarily closed for the
purposes of safety of navigation and overflight;
2) in areas with intensive fishing activities
declared by the coastal State;
3) in areas with special circumstances adopted in
accordance with Article 211 (6)(a) of the 1982
UNCLOS;
4) in marine parks or marine protected areas
declared by the coastal State as required by
Article 194 (5) of the 1982 UNCLOS;
5) in areas with intensive navigation and near sea
lanes and traffic separation schemes; and
6) near submarine cables and pipelines on the
seabed of the EEZ clearly marked by the
coastal State on large-scale charts recognized
by the coastal State.
If there are high seas immediately adjacent to the
coastal State’s EEZ, a State undertaking military
exercises should make every possible effort to limit
them to the high seas.

VII. SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY AND OTHER
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES
a. Ships in an EEZ are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their flag State, except in
circumstances provided by the 1982 UNCLOS or
other international treaties.
b. States may act in an EEZ of another State to seize a
pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest
the persons and seize the property onboard.
c. To suppress terrorism and illicit traffic in drugs,
persons, arms, and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), their delivery systems, and related
materials, States should:
1. board and search any vessel flying their flag in
their EEZ that is reasonably suspected of
transporting terrorists or being engaged in illicit
traffic in drugs, persons, arms, and WMD, their
delivery systems, or related materials, and seize
such cargoes that are identified as such; and
2. consent, under appropriate circumstances, to
the boarding and search of their own flag
vessels by other States, and to the seizure of
terrorists or drugs, persons, arms, and WMDrelated cargoes on such vessels that may be
mutually identified as such by both States.
d. The boarding and search of a foreign flag vessel in
an EEZ without the consent of the flag State is not
justified solely because it is suspected of illegal
trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems, or
related materials.
e. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels in
the EEZ of a coastal State, the arresting vessel
should through appropriate channels inform the
coastal State of the action taken.
VIII. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
a. Coastal State consent should in normal
circumstances be granted for marine scientific
research conducted exclusively for peaceful
purposes and in order to increase scientific
knowledge of the marine environment for the
benefit of all humanity.
b. Marine scientific research that has direct use for
living and non-living resource exploration and
exploitation, conservation and management is
entirely under the jurisdiction of the coastal State,
which is not obliged to grant consent to such
research by foreign vessels.
c. Overflight by manned or unmanned aircraft of one
State over the EEZ of another State should not be
conducted for the purpose of marine scientific
research without the consent of the coastal State.

VI. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH ELECTRONIC
SYSTEMS
a. The activities of another State in the EEZ of a
coastal State should not interfere with the
communications, computer, and electronic systems
of the coastal State, or make broadcasts that
adversely affect the defense or security of the
coastal State.
b. The coastal State should not interfere with the
communications, computer, and electronic systems
of vessels or aircraft of another State exercising its
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d. States should fulfill their obligations to provide
information to the coastal State in accordance with
the 1982 UNCLOS Article 248, and to comply with
certain conditions in the 1982 UNCLOS Article
249, particularly with regard to the participation of
the coastal State in marine scientific research
projects.

b.

IX. HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEYING
a. Hydrographic surveying should only be conducted
in the EEZ of another State with the consent of the
coastal State. This does not apply to the collection
of navigational data by a ship required for safe
navigation during the ship’s passage through an
EEZ.
b. Coastal State consent for hydrographic surveying
should normally be granted unless the surveys fall
within one of the consent categories in the 1982
UNCLOS Article 246(5).
c. The Guidelines in Articles VIII and IX also apply to
aircraft, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs),
remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and other
remotely operated devices of a State conducting
research or collecting data in an EEZ.

c.

d.

e.

other States that are frequently using or navigating
their EEZs.
The dissemination or the receipt of the legislation
by other States should not and does not constitute
recognition of or refusal thereof by the receiving
States of the legality of the legislation, unless
specifically so stated by the receiving States or
authorities.
A copy of those laws should also be deposited with
the UN Secretary-General, and be made available
for easy reference by any interested States,
authorities, or persons, with a view to increasing
transparency and mitigating any hostile intentions.
Military vessels and aircraft of a State exercising the
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ of
another State should observe and comply with the
coastal State’s legislation on the basis of goodwill,
or comply under protest.
Where States disagree, dialogue should be initiated
either at the bilateral or regional level.

XI. NON-PREJUDICIAL CLAUSE
a. Nothing contained in these Guidelines, or activities
taking place pursuant to them, should be interpreted
as prejudicing the position of any State in its claims
to sovereign rights or jurisdiction in its claimed
EEZ, or its rights and responsibilities therein under
the 1982 UNCLOS.

X. TRANSPARENCY OF LEGISLATION
a. Those States with policies and/or legislation
regarding military activities in their EEZs should
make them as transparent and as widely known as
possible, including to the military authorities of
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